respect the wishes of the deceased, and this constitutes a violation of the deceased patient's autonomy. 7 This criticism has considerable plausibility, especially when we consider other cases in which we would think it is clearly wrong for families to either override or have the power to override a patient's decision regarding the treatment of her body. For example, imagine that families had the power to veto a competent patient's decision to undergo surgery to treat cancer or other diseases; or suppose that the family had the power to veto a patient's advance directive that instructed physicians to take her off life support in the event of brain death.
Although many find compelling the claim that the power of the family to veto a patient's decision is wrong because it is inconsistent with respect for the patient's autonomy, in this paper I defend the position that when families veto an individual's recorded decision to donate and the individual's organs are not in the end removed, neither the doctors nor the family infringe on the individual's autonomy in any morally objectionable sense. Call this the Non-Removal Thesis. The Non-Removal thesis is not simply the view that doctors and families act within their rights by not removing the organs of a registered donor. For this is consistent with the view that although doctors and families act within their rights by failing to remove the donor's organs, they do act in a morally objectionable way towards the donor. I am not merely claiming that it's morally permissible --in the sense that it doesn't violate a potential donor's rights --to not remove a person's organs who has registered as an organ donor; I am also claiming that not removing the donor's organs would not be doing anything morally objectionable in terms of her autonomy. In other words, the fact that a person autonomously agrees to donate her organs fails to ground any autonomy-based moral objection to not removing and using them after the person's death.
I'll argue for the Non-Removal Thesis in a two-step process. First, I'll consider what happens when an individual registers to become an organ donor. I will argue that registering to become a donor is best interpreted as a mere act of authorization whereby an individual gives her consent to the State to remove her organs for transplantation 7 Veatch, Transplantation Ethics, 1 st edition; Shaw, "We should not let families stop organ donation from their dead relatives." Walter Glannon. "Taylor on Posthumous Organ Procurement." Journal of Medical Ethics 2014; Vol 40, No. 9: 637-638. purposes after she has died. Second, given this notion of authorization as giving consent, I'll argue by analogy for the Non-Removal Thesis by considering analogous cases of mere authorization or consent, and suggest that not bringing about a state of affairs to which an individual has consented does not constitute a violation or infringement of her autonomy. By analogy, when families veto an individual's decision to donate and the individual's organs are not in the end removed, they do not infringe on her autonomy in any morally objectionable sense.
INTREPETING THE ACT OF DONOR REGISTRATION
Before I begin, some clarifications are in order. One might think that, under an opt-in system, if a person does not register as a donor then her organs will not be removed, even if her family permits it. This is incorrect. In actual medical practice, even if a person has not registered as a donor, doctors will often ask for the donor's family to give consent to organ removal. In addition, if the deceased's family makes it known that the donor did in fact wish to donate, then this often suffices for organ removal as well. These kinds of cases -where no official decision regarding organ removal has been registered -are both important and interesting. However, they are starkly different kinds of cases that present different ethical issues from the cases I am in concerned with. 8 Thus, in this paper I am only concerned with cases in which (i) a person has officially registered as an organ donor, and (ii) her organs are not in the end removed. when a person registers as a donor, all we can conclude is that she has consented to organ removal.
Another reason to accept the Authorization Account involves a necessary condition on any acceptable interpretation of the act of donor registration. Any plausible interpretation must explain why it is permissible for the State to posthumously remove a person's organs for transplantation purposes if they have officially registered as a donor.
The Authorization Account provides a simple and plausible answer: it is permissible to posthumously remove the organs of a registered donor because, by registering, they have given their valid consent to the removal of their organs for transplantation purposes.
Consent, on the standard view, waives whatever rights the person has against unauthorized bodily invasions. 11 The Authorization Account thus exploits the commonly accepted view that gaining a patient's consent makes the posthumous removal of her organs permissible.
The main alternative to the Authorization Account is a view that sees the act of registration as a form of gift giving. 12 Thus, the Gift Account says that registering as a donor essentially involves gifting one's organs to the State or some other official procurement organization. One might object that the Gift Account is not a genuine alternative to the Authorization account since both involve the giving of consent. This worry is mistaken. Gift-giving necessarily involves features that need not be present when one is merely giving consent or authorizing the use of something that is properly yours. One of these features is that the giving of a gift involves the transfer of ownership of something, but consenting or authorizing that some thing be used need not involve a transfer of ownership. For example, if I have merely consented to you using my lawn mower, I haven't given it to you in the sense that it is now your property and not mine.
But if I give you my lawn mower as a gift, I give it to you in the sense that it is now your property and not mine. surgeons removed a donor's organs but instead used them for their personal biomedical research. Although doing this is consistent with the view that in donating one gives a gift, it is tacitly assumed that if one gives organs as a gift, it is expected that they be used for transplantation purposes. This could be viewed as a form of conditional gift giving: "you may have X only if you do such and such". This seems to be an improvement upon the original Gift Account. Registering to become a donor might therefore entail the giving of one's organs to the State on the condition that they are used for transplantation purposes.
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The second feature of the Gift Account that we need to consider concerns how to interpret the time at which the gift of a person's organs is actually given. Proponents of the Gift Account must make a choice between two different views of when the gift of a donor's organs is actually given. On the first view, by signing up to become a donor, a person successfully gives the gift of her organs to the State or the relevant procurement organization; however, although the gift has been given, it can only be used in the future once the donor has died. Consider how a parent might give her child the gift of a college savings account that can only be used once the child grows up and goes to college. The parent gives the child the gift now, but the gift can only be used at a later time.
Alternatively, on the second view, when a person registers to be an organ donor, they are not giving the State the gift of their organs now; rather, the gift can only be given once the registered donor has died. Once the person has died, then the gift can be given and received.
The problem is that, no matter which view we accept, the Gift Account runs into trouble. Consider the first version of the Gift Account. The problem is that in normal giftgiving, once a person successfully gives a gift to another person, it is inappropriate for her to take back what she has given as a gift. For example, if I receive movie passes from my relative as a birthday gift, then my relative cannot simply take back what is no longer hers a day later. The problem, however, is that people are permitted (and should be permitted) to change their donor status.
14 Suppose I register to become a donor but then later come to realize that I wish to be buried with my organs intact. In that case, I may change my donor status and this decision will be respected. But the fact that people may change their donor status is inconsistent with the view that one gives a gift when one signs up to become a donor.
One might object and suggest that there are cases in which a person gives a gift but then later changes her mind and takes back the gift. For example, suppose I sign my will, which includes giving 500 dollars to Oxfam after my death. It seems that I am giving a gift to Oxfam, but this is consistent with me later changing my mind and altering the will to not include a 500-dollar gift to Oxfam. Similarly, it can be consistently maintained that a registered donor gives her organs as a gift, but that she may later change her mind and take back the gift. To reply, I suggest that the scenario involving the leaving of 500 dollars to Oxfam is not actually a case of gift giving. What this scenario seems more like is a case of giving instructions. In particular, my will gives instructions to the relevant parties on how to dispose of my property and assets. In general, a person can always change her mind about the instructions concerning how to dispose of what is rightfully hers. But the same does not hold for gift giving. Indeed, it would be a strange conception of gift giving if it turned out that every gift giver was able to give a gift to another party and then take it back whenever she pleased.
Let's now consider the second version of the Gift Account. The problem for this version occurs when a registered donor's organs cannot be used for certain medical reasons. For example, a person who has signed up to become a donor may have died in circumstances such that their organs could not be properly preserved for transplantation, and hence their organs will not be used for transplantation. This presents a problem for the second version of the Gift Account. On the Gift Account, a person gives a conditional gift to the State when they register as a donor: remove my organs only if they are used for transplantation purposes. But if a registered donor's organs are not medically viable, then they cannot be used for transplantation purposes. In such cases, then, no gift is successfully given to the State because the sole condition on which the gift may be given,
i.e. that the organs be used for transplantation, cannot be satisfied. This implies that registered donors, who turn out to have defective organs for transplantation purposes, did not actually give a gift to the State. But surely all registered organ donors, including those whose organs are not usable for transplantation, have done something that has changed the normative status of their situation in relation to the State. This is because, had a registered donor's organs been medically viable upon their death, it would have been morally permissible for the State to remove their organs and use them in transplantation.
But the second version of the Gift Account cannot explain this normative change, since, in cases where the person's organs are not viable for transplantation, no gift has actually been given to the State.
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The Authorization Account, in contrast, can easily explain the normative change that occurs in situations where the organs of registered donors are not medically viable.
On the Authorization Account, even if a registered donor's organs cannot be used, he or she has previously authorized the State to posthumously remove her organs for transplantation purposes; therefore, had the person's organs been useable for transplantation, it would have been permissible for the State to remove and use them in transplantation.
Given this second problem for the Gift Account, one might respond by putting forth a slightly different view, according to which, registering to become a donor involves merely offering the gift of one's organs for transplantation purposes. Call this the Gift-Offer Account.
On the Gift-Offer Account Finally, let's consider a view on which when a person registers as a donor, a promise is made between her and the State. What I will call the Promise Account can be spelled out in two different ways. On the first interpretation, in registering as a donor, the State promises the individual that her organs will be removed and used if they are medically viable for transplantation. On the second interpretation, registering as a donor involves the individual promising the State that she will donate her organs after death. On this second account, however, a third party, such as a transplantation surgeon, must discharge the promise, since the individual who made the original promise will be dead at the time at which the promise must be discharged.
Both versions of the Promise Account are implausible. Consider the second version of the Promise Account, which says that when an individual registers to become an organ donor, she promises to give her organs to the State if they are medically viable after death. The major problem for this account can be put as follows. By registering as a donor, a person promises the State that a third party will remove her organs after her death. But when a person makes a promise to another party (e.g. the State), this plausibly generates a prima facie obligation to discharge the promise. 16 In this case, the promise made by the individual generates a duty on her part to posthumously donate her organs.
But suppose that a registered donor later decides while alive that she no longer wishes to donate her organs and so she changes her status to a non-donor. In that case, she has made a promise and broken it. By breaking it, she has failed to fulfill a prima facie obligation, and consequently, she has done something prima facie wrong. But it is surely absurd to suppose that a person has done anything prima facie wrong by deciding to change her donor status to a non-donor. 17 Since this is an implication of the second version of the Promise Account, the account ought to be rejected.
Alternatively, consider the first version of the Promise Account. The view is that, by registering as a donor, the State makes a promise to remove and use a person's organs after their death. The first problem is that it is difficult to see how an action that an individual performs (e.g. registering as a donor) entails that an entity distinct from her (the State) has made a promise to her about some thing (e.g. to posthumously remove her organs). In general, if some agent A makes a promise to another agent B, then A, rather than B, must do some action that generates the promise. Thus, since it is the individual herself registering as a donor, it is difficult to see how this could be understood as the Second, recall that a necessary condition on any acceptable interpretation of donor registration is to explain why it is permissible for the State to posthumously remove a person's organs for transplantation purposes if they have officially registered as a donor.
The problem is that a mere promise to remove a donor's viable organs may not be sufficient to permissibly remove them after death. Consider the following analogy. You own a record collection that I very much want. You show me the collection and I leave you a note telling you that I promise to take your record collection from you. Given these details alone, it seems impermissible for me to take the records from you. After all, you never signaled that you accept my promise, nor did you consent to have your records removed from your possession. Thus, my promise to you that I will take your record collection is not sufficient to permissibly take them. By analogy, the promise made to the registered donor on behalf of the State is not sufficient to permissibly remove her organs after death.
It might be argued that, in addition to the State promising to posthumously remove her organs, a person accepts the promise that the State makes to her when she registers as an organ donor. Call this the Promise-Acceptance Account. 18 The problem with this account is that it is subject to a similar problem as the second version of the Promise Account, namely, that if a registered donor later changes her donor status to a non-donor, she has thereby accepted and then rejected a promise made by the State to her. But accepting a promise and then breaking the terms of that promise is prima facie wrong. Therefore, an implication of the Promise Acceptance Account is that registering as a donor and then changing one's status to a non-donor is prima facie wrong. But surely it is not wrong for a person to register as a donor and then change her status to a nondonor. To illustrate, suppose you are thinking of selling your car to me. I take interest and I promise you that I will buy the car in two days time. Account, the account ought to be rejected.
One might argue that, in the car example, breaking the promise to sell your car is not wrong because the car is your property and you can, within reasonable limits, do whatever you please with your property.
Let's grant the objector the claim that, since the car is my property, I have a right to do whatever I want with the car, including breaking the original promise. But it doesn't follow from the fact that I have a right to do whatever I want with my car that therefore it is morally right to break the promise. Indeed, it is still prima facie wrong to break the promise, despite having the right to do so. But notice that, in order for my objection against the Promise-Acceptance Account to succeed, all I need is the claim that the Promise-Acceptance Account entails that it is prima facie wrong for registered donors to change their status to a non-donor. Therefore, the above objection fails.
Given the problems with both the Gift and Promise Accounts, and given the positive reasons to accept the Authorization Account, I submit that the most plausible interpretation of the act of donor registration is that an individual gives her consent to the State for the posthumous removal of her organs for transplantation purposes.
THE NON-REMOVAL THESIS AND THE FAMILY VETO
Now that I have argued that the Authorization Account is correct, I am in a position to present an argument from analogy for the conclusion that the Non-Removal Thesis is true. 19 Before I proceed, however, some preliminary points regarding the nature of 19 One might wonder whether the Gift-Account supports the Non-Removal thesis, in which case the discussion concerning the Authorization and Gift Account would have been unnecessary. First, I should note that whether the Gift Account supports the Non-Removal thesis is irrelevant because I've argued that the Gift Account is an implausible account of what happens when a person registers as an organ donor. Since the Gift Account is false, whether it supports the NonRemoval thesis is not relevant for my purposes. However, let's suppose for the sake of argument that the Gift Account were true. How would that affect the Non-Removal Thesis? I think the Non-Removal Thesis would still be a plausible thesis, assuming that the Gift Account is true.
autonomy and the nature of the family veto are in order. There is, however, a reason to be skeptical about applying the concept of autonomy to deceased organ donors. 23 One might argue that once a person loses the capacity to be an autonomous decision-maker --in this case, because she has died --then it no longer makes sense to appeal to her autonomy when we fail to honor her choices.
Thus, to claims that it is a violation of the dead donor's autonomy when her organs are not removed against her wishes seems to be a mistaken way of characterizing the situation. In other words, since the dead donor is no longer autonomous, we can no longer sensibly speak of her autonomy being violated by the decisions of others.
While this line of criticism is initially compelling, there is a possible reply to this objection that mirrors the reply to an important objection to the notion of posthumous harm. To begin, imagine that Laura has a strong desire that her children have successful careers when they grow up. However, because of her terminal illness, Laura dies when her children are relatively young. Many years later, however, Laura's children all lose their jobs and end up bankrupt. Thus, Laura's desire that her children have successful careers is frustrated. Given her frustrated desire, has Laura been harmed? Opponents of posthumous harm argue that Laura has not been harmed because, although her desire has been frustrated, there is no subject of the harm. Since all harms require subjects, and since Laura is deceased, no harm has occurred. Call this the No-Subject problem.
In a now famous paper, George Pitcher attempted to solve the No-Subject problem by drawing a distinction between the post-mortem self and the ante-mortem self. 24 The post-mortem self refers to the rotting corpse in the grave; a mere rotting body.
By contrast, the ante-mortem self refers to the alive and existing person. Pitcher argues that when Laura's wish is frustrated after her death, the harm does not attach to postmortem Laura, since post-mortem Laura is nothing but a rotting corpse. Rather, when Laura's wish is frustrated after her death, the harm attaches to Laura, the ante-mortem person; that is, the harm attaches to Laura when she was alive and had the desire that her children have successful careers. On Pitcher's view, "the sense in which an ante-mortem person is harmed by an unfortunate event after his death is this: the occurrence of the event makes it true that during the time before the person's death, he was harmed -- 23 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for bringing this problem to my attention. 24 George Pitcher. "The Misfortunes of the Dead." American Philosophical Quarterly 1984, Vol. 21 No 2: 183-188. harmed in that the unfortunate event was going to happen". 25 Thus, the fact that Laura's children have failed careers makes it true that the ante-mortem Laura was indeed harmed.
A similar response can be crafted in reply to the charge that it makes little sense to speak of a deceased person's autonomy being violated since the deceased are not autonomous beings. Suppose Julio very much wants his organs donated and when he dies, his organs are usable but they are not removed. If we accept Pitcher's reasoning above, the fact that Julio's organs were not used makes it true that ante-mortem Julio's wish was frustrated, and hence, ante-mortem Julio's autonomy was violated.
Note that it is not my concern in this paper to assess whether this reply is ultimately successful. However, the reply does show that there is at least one prima facie plausible way to think about posthumous autonomy violations. Although I am overall sympathetic to the worry that it makes little sense to talk about the autonomy of the deceased being violated, I believe it is more productive, from an argumentative standpoint, to meet opponent's of the family veto on their own terms. That is, we should assume, for the sake of argument, that it makes sense to talk about posthumous autonomy violations and then argue that it is still not the case that the family veto violates the deceased's autonomy.
Now that I have granted the idea that there can be posthumous autonomy violations, we should briefly explore the nature of the family veto. What exactly do families do when they veto a donor's recorded decision? It should be noted at the outset that, in many countries, the family has no legal power to block a donor's decision to donate, unless the family provides credible evidence that the patient had changed her mind about donation since signing up to be a donor. 26 Legally, doctors are permitted to ignore the family's veto and procure organs from a registered donor anyway. However, when a registered donor has viable organs that can be removed for transplantation, most doctors will, as a matter of practice, consult the donor's family on their preferences about donation. If the families have a strong preference against donating their family member's organs, doctors will typically act in accordance with the family for various political and practical reasons. 27 Thus, the family veto is better understood as the stating of a preference against donation, and doctors in practice either act against or in accordance with that preference. This understanding of the family veto as the stating of a preference against donation will play an important role in constructing my argument from analogy below.
To begin, consider the following case. Brenda has a spare car that she never uses, so one day she tells Ana that if she ever needs to use the spare car for something, she is allowed to do so. A year passes when one day Ana is babysitting a client's child and the child accidently poisons herself by drinking a mislabeled jar of liquid. The child needs immediate medical attention or else she will surely die. Ana does not own a car but she remembers that Brenda granted her permission to use her spare car for whatever reason.
Ana entertains taking Brenda's car to the hospital, but in the end she does not borrow the car. As a result, the child dies under Ana's care.
It seems clear that Ana has done something wrong by failing to take Brenda's car to the hospital. However, the wrongness of her act plausibly consists in the fact that she failed to save the life of the child under her care when it was relatively easy to do so. It seems equally clear, however, that the wrongness of Ana's actions does not consist in the fact that she violated Brenda's autonomy by not borrowing her spare car. The moral innocence of Ana's actions towards Brenda's autonomy seems to be captured by the general moral principle that failing to bring about a state of affairs that someone has merely consented to is not a morally objectionable violation of their autonomy. Call this the Consent-Autonomy Principle.
That the Consent-Autonomy Principle is true is confirmed by examples in other contexts. For instance, if I decide to give my old coat away by leaving it on the side of the dumpster, I have relinquished my claim to the coat and have thus consented to others taking the coat. But the mere fact that I consented to others taking the coat does not generate an obligation on the part of other people to take the coat. The fact that someone fails to take the coat does not constitute a morally objectionable violation of my autonomy. Similarly, if I consent to my friend using my lawn mower, it doesn't follow that she now has an obligation to borrow the lawn mower. Her failing to borrow the lawn mower would not constitute a morally objectionable act of failing to respect my autonomy.
One might argue that perhaps Ana has a special obligation towards Brenda to borrow her car, and hence, failing to borrow the car would be violating this special obligation. The problem is that the sorts of actions that would normally generate special obligations are entirely absent from the Brenda and Ana case: Ana has made no promises towards Brenda, nor has she entered into an implicit or explicit contract with Brenda that could generate such a special obligation. The same, I suggest, is true for failing to remove organs from a person who has merely given their consent to organ removal. If potential donors give the State permission to posthumously remove their organs and doctors decide not to take the organs because of the family's preferences, they do not violate the autonomy of the registered donor in any morally significant way. This is the case for precisely the reason offered above in the case of Brenda and Ana: that failing to bring about a state of affairs (in this case, posthumous organ removal) that someone has merely consented to is not a morally objectionable violation of their autonomy.
One might object that the difference between failing to procure organs from a patient who has consented and the case of Ana failing to borrow Brenda's car is that in the former, there is the expectation on the part of the patient that her organs will be taken and used in transplantation. After all, when patients consent to posthumous organ removal, it's plausible that many of them expect their viable organs to be posthumously removed if they do give their consent to organ removal.
Although this objection appears superficially plausible, this initial plausibility evaporates when we consider analogous cases. To borrow two examples already discussed above: If I decide to leave my coat by the dumpster so that it can be picked up by someone who needs it, the fact that I expect someone to pick it up doesn't mean that my autonomy has been disrespected or violated if it happens to turn out that nobody picks up the coat. Or, suppose I permit my neighbor to borrow the lawnmower and I expect her to borrow it as well; my neighbor failing to borrow the lawnmower does not seem to constitute a failure to respect my autonomy, even assuming that I expected her to borrow it.
Secondly, a critic might object that the case of Brenda and Ana is dis-analogous from organ procurement because the Brenda-Ana case is a transaction involving two parties. However, organ procurement is more accurately viewed as involving three parties: the donor, the State (or transplantation physician), and the donor's family. What happens is that a donor gives her consent to the State to posthumously remove her organs; then the doctor seeks the family's preferences about donating the patient's organs and then either acts against or in accordance with those preferences. I suggest that correcting for this dis-analogy makes no difference to our assessment of whether Ana violates Brenda's autonomy in a morally objectionable sense.
Consider, then, the following variation of the Brenda-Ana case. As before, Brenda has a spare car that she never uses, so one day she tells Ana that if she ever needs to use the spare car for something, she is allowed to do so. However, Brenda's parents are also present and they tell Ana that since the car has been in their family for such a long time, they strongly prefer that the car not ever be borrowed. A year passes when one day Ana is babysitting a client's child and the child accidently poisons herself by drinking a mislabeled jar of liquid. The child needs immediate medical attention or else she will surely die. Since Ana doesn't have a car, she remembers that Brenda granted her permission to use her spare car for whatever reason. Ana gives taking Brenda's car to the hospital some thought, and she also considers that Brenda's parents have a strong preference against anybody borrowing the car. In the end, Brenda decides not to borrow the car. As a result, the child dies under Ana's care. My reply to this religious case is the same as the second reply to the above case.
That is, even if the family's refusal in this case is a wrongful violation of the deceased's autonomy, this case is disanalogous from the organ removal cases under dispute because it is one in which the person has a very deeply rooted wish to donate her organs, yet this deep wish is not honored. Indeed, suppose the religious person did not have a deeply held wish to donate but instead merely consented to the use of her organs by signing a donor card. In that case, as I have argued, it would not be a wrongful violation of her autonomy if her organs are not removed because of the family's preference against donation.
This concludes the defense of my argument from analogy for the Non-Removal Thesis.
CONCLUSION
In this paper I argued that the Authorization Account is the most plausible interpretation concerning what happens when a person registers as an organ donor. Next, I argued by analogy for the Non-removal Thesis, i.e. the view that not removing a patient's organs in part because of the preferences of their family does not fail to respect the donor's autonomy in any significant sense. Thus, if a person has registered to become an organ donor and her family's preference against donation leads transplantation physicians to not remove the person's organs, this is not a morally objectionable violation of the deceased's autonomy.
What my argument shows is that the family veto problem is not a problem about the donor's autonomy and the family's failure to respect it. Rather, the fundamental issue with the family veto problem is that too many useable organs are not removed because the family does not want them removed, and hence, many patients on the transplantation waiting list suffer or die when they would have been given a second lease on life had the organs been used. Indeed, in the United States, there are currently 120,000 men, women, and children on the organ transplantation waiting list. 8,000 of these patients die every year due to not receiving a new organ in time.
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This practical problem does, however, raise some interesting theoretical questions. Among these is whether the family's autonomy, in deciding what happens to their loved one's organs, outweighs the needs of those on the waiting list. Since autonomy is considered a sacrosanct value in contemporary bioethics, arguably outweighing every other value including beneficence and non-maleficence, it might be the case that we ought to respect the family's wishes, even at the cost of not saving lives.
One potential argument for this position is that, since individuals have the right to chose to not have their organs donated, and hence, the right to not save the lives of patients on the waiting list, then perhaps the families of the deceased who have merely consented to organ removal also have the right to choose not to donate their loved one's organs to help others on the waiting list. Although I do not have the space here to consider whether this argument succeeds, it is at least one prima facie plausible argument in favor of the claim that the family's autonomous decision outweighs the needs of patients on the waiting list. 
